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# CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS.

## I.

### PROFESSOR EDWARD ZELLER.

Professor Zeller was born in 1814. At the age of twenty-six he became docent of theology in Tübingen, in 1849 was called to Berne as assistant professor, and to Marburg as full professor two years later. In 1862 he was called to Heidelberg and transferred from theology to the chair of Philosophy, and ten years later came to Berlin as the successor of Trendelenburg, where he is now the leading teacher among six in his department. Here, in 1878 he was elected rector, receiving, according to the liberal German custom, a large fraction of all the examination fees. His chief publications are, *Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*, the first edition of which was begun in 1844, the fourth in 1876; *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, in two volumes, 1875 and 1877, and *Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie seit Leibnitz*, in one volume, 1873. He was the founder and for many years the editor of *Die Theologische Zeitschrift*, and has written shorter articles, to be found only in its pages. Personally he is a man of moderate height, almost alarmingly thin, sallow, of distinct, deliberate monotonous delivery, of genial but somewhat precise manners in personal intercourse. His lectures attract hundreds of students each semester. As a comparatively young man he married the daughter of F. C. Baur of Tübingen, and his family relations have been exceptionally happy. He, with several others of the prominent professors of Berlin, was a frequent and familiar guest of the family of the Crown Prince, Friedrich, and according to common report, was in an informal way the religious adviser of his consort. Next to Lotze he has been, no doubt, the most influential professor in his department in Germany. He has no system whatever, but has devoted his life to the critico-historical presentation of the views of others—a department of labor to which nearly half of all the philosophic writings and philosophic lectures in the German Universities are now devoted. In this work he is probably without a peer.

We shall first epitomize for our readers his remarkable summary of recent investigations in the field of comparative religions and the psychology of religion in the newly edited two volumes of essays, which contain his most personal as well as, perhaps, original views. In a laboriously compacted essay on the Origin and Essence of Religion he premises that philosophy, or psychology is the closest and most indispensable friend of religion. Doubt, which marks the important moment when we question or seek explanation about things which have surrounded us from childhood, is sure to lead to a deeper and purer faith, if it is manfully faced. The notion of God is not innate but is given perhaps necessarily, although always mediately, through experience, and thus rests upon the same sort of grounds and inferences as the notion of atoms, and is as scientific. In fact all intellectual possessions whatever are self-won, *we make* all which comes into our minds out of experience. All men irresistibly infer that there are laws and that things are connected, not merely in time and space but inwardly; they not merely *are*, but *hang* together, and that not only in our ideas objectively carried over into experience but in themselves by the law of causation. Like all things else, causality itself must have a cause.

Thus at first as many substances are postulated as there are forces observed; later these forces are found so closely connected, their actions and reactions so poised and equipolated, the one by the other, that they must be thought as one. But this unity is, of course, as hypersensuous and immaterial as force itself. Consciousness in its essence is a union of the manifold, and hence by the very form of its knowing, its every object, whether cosmic or microcosmic must be a unity of the composite or the simple. Hence the necessity of inferring a primitive unitary force.

In illustration of these principles he proceeds to group a great number of facts gathered from popular psychology and mythology. From just such feelings as arise vividly in our own consciousness when we take the first spring ramble in the country, by the sea, or under the stars, from just such instinctive needs as we now feel in the thunderstorms, floods, in battle, famine or in sickness, and from the experience of common family and social life, not only all poetry and mythology but all religion have taken their origin. These are the feelings and needs they interpret. The strongest and most unwonted impressions drive us irresistibly beyond the limits of our own ability or knowledge to supernatural causes. General forces are not deified. There are no gods of space or gravity. There was no interest in the beautiful but only in the pleasant and the fearful; and what was more fearful than night before man was possessed of fire. Because most of his instincts are satisfied, man assumes that somehow his wishes also must be, and so, when thought asks, fancy answers questions, though the answers are but changed facts. Thus the first religions are polytheistic and preserve a faithful record of the wishes, fears and hopes of prehistoric peoples whose spirits were wrought upon by nature and history with an intensity inversely as their knowledge of them. As long as no one dreamed that, e. g., even the sun and fire might be the same, no one thought of ordering this crowding and increasing throng of deities. But as men saw unity in the world and later as they learned to concentrate their own efforts upon some one paramount object, did first some group of gods become paramount, and later some one god was made king or president in the council of the others. Sometimes a tribe who had developed a national deity like that of the Jews induced others by argument or by the sword to accept it as their own. Perhaps monotheism was first the result of a philosophical critique, as among the disciples of Xenophanes, or again unity was favored or suggested by the all-enclosing arch of heaven and the apparent limits of the horizon and the visible universe. The visible always precede the invisible gods, and monotheism is always developed from polytheism. The personification of active forces is in fact the natural form under which the idea of cause is first represented. It is impossible to follow all the subtle associations of ideas by which the wind was represented as a breath, the lightning as God's spear, every bright or smooth stone as an amulet, the stars as living beings, by which a stick was thought to reveal hidden treasure, or a backward look to the left to cure sickness. Whether it was at first some fancied analogy or a rare but opportune chance sequence in time to which they owe their origin, they have possessed the mind of man for unnumbered ages, and hence, and because they minister, however unworthily, to a real need they are very hard to eradicate. As long as there is no postulate that all things are connected by laws, and in proportion as man is uncertain of his own position in an unexplored world where the most unexpected thing may happen to him at any moment, so long and so far is he anxious to get the unknown powers on his side by presents, wounds self inflicted, the offering of animals and finally of human beings and especially of innocent persons. Sometimes the deity is small and weak, or perhaps the priest, who even in the catholic church

holds a sort of conjuring power, has found some magic liturgy or ceremony of mighty and constraining cogency and the god may even be whipped or imprisoned till the wish is gratified or the fear allayed.

But religions must ever become more rational, i. e. immaterial. This process begins before all known developed languages, in the inference that soul and body are distinct, and that the *ego* is not a whole, made up of soul and body as subordinate unities. In the sight of a dead acquaintance and in dreams this distinction begins. The souls of men are at first located in the heart, head, bowels, liver, diaphragm, etc., and are weak and shadowy. The "he himself" is the body, as in Homer. They lead an unreal life under the earth, affecting the fruits of the fields, are figured as ghosts, manes, elves, and finally, in German mythology, survive as dwarfs, till the conception took more definite form in the idea of Hades. At first only chiefs and leaders had souls and these are invoked along with the sun and moon as in the worship of ancestors.

As long as their favor could be bought deities had, of course, no moral character. As hospitality, agriculture, commercial and family life, conceptions of regularity in nature, etc., were developed, the gods ceased to be awe or fear-inspiring (*unheimisch*) and influenced more directly the life men. Religion now began to grow in importance with the worth of the moral life. The lowest form of prophecy is the interpretation of signs. Faith is the child of the wish; then an audible voice must speak from the clouds; then men are inspired by a daimon, which is the inner oracle of conviction below distinct consciousness. They are suddenly and perhaps violently possessed by ideas, which wrap them in a dream, revery or vision, so new and so absorbing that the poet or musician dare not claim his work as his own. They did not know the inner process but were sure of its results, and thus inspiration was the best form which creative genius knew to give itself.

From the above principles of its growth we may infer why religion sometimes became largely political as among the Jews; why ancient systems lay great weight upon the cultus or worship and modern upon dogmatic orthodoxies; why religions must change; why the tension between the old and the new is proportional to the rapidity of this change, why all that cannot be harmonized to the new standpoints should, as Schleiermacher said, be allowed to lapse from the Christian consciousness and above all we can see that, as we should not study the Bible to know what Jesus believed but what we must,—so the worth of religion does not depend on how it originated but on what it does, just as the dignity of man and of science are not impaired by the conviction that one was developed from the ape and the other from astrology, alchemy, etc., or as the cogency of a man's logic is not prejudiced by the fact that a few decades ago we could use only baby-language. Not the first form but the historic principle is the essential thing. No man loses esteem for the German people of today by reading Tacitus or studying the life of the mediaeval Teutonic tribes.

A poetic race will emphasize the mythological element, a speculative people the dogmatic and a practical the active side of religious life, but Schleiermacher was right in seeking a deeper common principle. We must always reason from what the religious consciousness *says* to what it *means*. Dogma ignores scientific interests. Knowledge is no measure of the worth of religious life and is valueless for its own sake. Morality, very far from being the natural and implacable enemy of religion, as Feuerbach argued, is its chief, but not only constituent. As well argue against the use of fire on account of conflagration or against civic life because of corruption, or against judicial tribunals because they sanctioned the torture chamber, as to reject religion because of the selfishness, fanaticism and superstition which are ever found to attend it. Religion is not merely recognition of our duties as divine commands,

any more than the notion of God originated in the moral sense, but it includes everything which concerns the well being of man. It rests upon and is determined by the needs of social and individual life and especially of the *Gemüth*. Its cultus is the natural expression of a natural feeling and must evoke worthy frames of mind and all noble resolves. Does it bring joy and certainty into the life of the soul, does it increase the sense of personal happiness, rest, peace, etc., and not does it make us work successfully for the rewards of a future pay-day, are the questions? Can we dispense with the sense of our universal relationship and give up the postulate of the search for a unity of all things?

In his religious views Zeller has been greatly influenced by Schleiermacher whom he very justly terms "the greatest of all protestant theologians," a many-sided, Platonic mind, a true ethical genius who *must* preach," and who is best understood not by his avowed pupils but by those who, refuting his letter by his spirit, his later by his earlier works, have passed beyond his standpoint. His great object was to mediate between supernaturalism and rationalism, mysticism and empiricism, docetism and ebionetism, manicheism and pelagianism, to test the true value of all knowledge by the religious consciousness, to bring the culture of his time back to piety. In his earlier writings Schleiermacher argued that scripture became Bible solely by force of its own inward excellence, by the natural law of survival, in short that christianity does not insist upon being the only form of religion, but would prefer at any time to yield to a better should it appear. Not only all dogma but even Jesus himself, to whose person he attached such central importance later, but who never claimed to be the only mediator, were not indispensable to the Christianity characterized in the religious *Reden*. His philosophy was always for the sake of his theology of which it was only a broader form. God and the world, he says, are different expressions for the same worth, each unthinkable without the other. God is the essence of the world and not a will over it; hence there is no difference between His will and knowledge, between the possible and actual, between ability to do and performance. As providence is the law of nature, there can be no miracles, no origin of the world, no physical answers to prayer. Personal life is not the essence of the soul, but its phenomena, and the imperfection of the individual is but a part of the perfection of the whole. In short Spinozism is softened and idealized.

Corresponding to Kant's distinction between the sensory and the understanding, Schleiermacher distinguishes the organic from the intellectual function, the former as material and manifold, the latter as unifying, and each making and needing the other. All experience impels us to God, whom nevertheless we cannot know; yet he does not infer God to be unknowable, like Kant's thing *per se*, from the antithesis of our faculties, but because the nature of the ideas given in experience does not correspond to the God-idea which latter he thus illogically Zeller thinks presupposes. Our will he says fluctuates, but we vainly seek for the ground of will; while for Kant it is the will which first opens the intellectual world. The deepest problem—the relation between will and being—is found in personality, which is the appearance of the infinite spirit, and is the compendium of the universe. It must be developed to the fullest individuality between which and general laws there is no conflict. This noble romanticism, by which he strives to unite earnestness and scientific breadth and to rescue the abstract morals of Kant and Fichte from their subjectivity, makes our inmost nature the picture of the infinite, and personality the organ of knowing it. Here God and every moral principle is revealed, the knowledge of which we must work out into ever purer forms. Thus religion is feeling. Pure and perfect self-feeling, however, would be a knowledge of God

without the world, which is impossible because the God idea can never be freed from antithesis. But conception also gives a notion of God, hence religion is not over philosophy, and while the former should be universal, reason and criticism are also allowed free scope.

Over against an absolute power and causality no feeling but that of dependence, or of being determined, is possible. This form of feeling is originally given with personality, before all self-activity. We dare not say that we know its source, as substance or otherwise, hence there is no God-idea, save the vague *whence* of the feeling of absolute dependence, and all attempts to personify God are gratuitous. Religion originates naturally in us, but we must actively develop it, and it remains ever imperfect; hence there are always parts of sin as well as of grace in us. The former preceding the latter, as the life of sense precedes the life of mind. Because as feeling, it is the most individual, religious life most needs enlargement in companionship. It is aroused by intercourse and needs community. This is the basis of the church. Every experience or representation of the individual life by word or act, which arouses others to responsively produce the same state in themselves, is revelation. This is best seen in the expressive individuality of a relatively perfect type, and others are aroused to discipleship.

So far Zeller essentially agrees with his teacher; but when the latter proceeds to make Jesus typically perfect—(*urbildlich*) as a historical person by virtue of his special religion or God-consciousness, Zeller objects that Schleiermacher failed to prove the latter, and that Jesus in no authentic passage claims typical perfection. Jesus may be a perfect man, but he is not thus proven a God-man, and as such neither his person nor the dogmatic deduction from it are natural. With surprising critical freedom Schleiermacher, in the matured form of his system, urges that all Christ's acts and words merely reveal his personality and so far as this creates or wakens my religious life, or in other words makes grace outweigh sin in me, he may be called my redeemer. There is absolutely no substitute or proxy bearing of the penalty of sin. The church visible and invisible, or actual and ideal or typical simply aids men to reproduce the image of Christ, as a norm in their own lives. Thus in explaining the creative beginning of moral life in Jesus and the church according to profound and more or less intelligible psychologic laws, in exploring the essence of religion, and in transforming its traditions to the spirit of our times, in giving even theology a new ground in modern consciousness, and in deriving all from self-consciousness. Schleiermacher's work is incomparable and imperishable. But when, as dogmatist, he treats the gospels, and even John before all, as historical and labors with such painful ingenuity to pour his new wine into the old vessels which Strauss and Baur were so soon and so easily to shatter, he was not only inconsistent with the freedom of his own earlier position, but brought long discredit upon his religious philosophy, the most profound and quickening in modern thought. Zeller's attitude to Schleiermacher is thus somewhat analogous to that of J. S. Mill to Comte. While reproducing and developing the spirit of his earlier best period with ripened and condensed vigor, he rejects the tortuous scholasticism of his dogmatic and exegetical [according to Darner his best and most matured] systematizing, as worthless. Religion is well called a feeling, but to describe its content as one of absolute dependence is inadequate or at least misleading. It is as well the consciousness of absolute freedom in a pregnant Hegelian sense. No matter how philosophic the conception of fatalism may be made, it must ever be prejudicial to moral accountability.

In discussing the teleological and mechanical explanation of nature, which is perhaps the most fundamental question of religious philosophy Zeller urges that it is equally senseless and tasteless to conceive animals

as machines, the world as a huge time-piece, the mind as a body, attraction as caused by hooked atoms or to banish all notion of final causes as barren vestals on the one hand, and to explain trifles teleologically on the other. Neither can he agree with Plato and Aristotle that nature is to be explained in part mechanically and in part teleologically, nor with Leibnitz that the world as a whole is teleological and single phenomena mechanical. While the latter satisfies science it grants too much to metaphysics. All possible worlds had no struggle for existence in Gods mind, but the world as it is is the only possible form of its revelation, and is hence necessary. In a perfect nature the divine will and ability coincide with action. The world has no beginning or end in time. It was never without life and reason in some form. Because necessity is perfect and absolute it must be best conceived as imminently teleological, and the antithesis between the two applies only to its elements and not to the world as a whole. The need of the latter is only felt after man's acts have become plan-full, and if granted would require an infinite series of reasons, which at bottom would be, like the conclusions from logical premises, rather more mechanical than otherwise. Before matter, as space filling, moving, etc., can become an adequate logical cause of all things it must be conceived in a radically new way, while teleology is at most only one heuristic presupposition, and not a scientifically-grounded constitutive principle.

The development of monotheism Zeller considers as the most important of moral-theoretical problems, and among the Greeks the most gifted of all races, it is especially suggestive. The poesy of Homer and Hesiod depicts Zeus, the God-king, as subject to fate, surrounded by a turbulent and tricky aristocracy of deities, and although the protector of rights, as yet possessing no very moral character. His rule is far milder than that in the shadowy old dispensation of the Euminides. The poets were the first theologians, and it was they who reformed the crudities of the the early faith. Philosophy did not grow up, as since the christian era, in the service of theology. Xenophanes contributed the first monotheistic conception in describing men and gods as having one origin, and the Infinite One as being all eye, ear, thought, etc. From his keen irony *e. g.* in saying the Thracian gods have blue eyes and red hair, and that horses and oxen could they think and speak, would have quadruped gods like themselves, anthropomorphic polytheism never entirely recovered. The teachings of the sophists, which pervaded all ranks of society,—that we cannot tell whether the gods exist or not, that religion was the invention of shrewd legislators who sought in an appeal to fear the strongest sanction for their laws, or that the Gods represent those natural objects found to be the most useful, was followed by Socrates' conception of a unitary plan in nature and an all wise and good principle over-ruling all things. Yet he was by no means hostile to the popular religion, but believed in many Gods, who do all for the good of man, who must submit to and obey them, but also in a world-forming reason over all. The Eleatics believed in one only God, not in human form; the Cynics ridiculed the popular faith; the Skeptics declared it not proven, the Epicurians thought chance and necessity ruled the universe and that the gods led a life of placid repose, far off between the worlds and were worthy of unselfish veneration. Over Plato's eternal, changeless, ideal world, the Good rules supreme. It is the ground of all thought and being, giving to things reality and to thought truth. It is essential deity, towards which we strive in every act and thought, yet hard to know. It created and rules the world, is approached by purity of life, is not jealous of human happiness, is beyond feeling pleasure or pain in human acts. To this conception christian theology is immensely indebted. Yet Plato does not give up the idea of other visible gods. Stars, like the world, are incorporate

deities. Men must be trained by mythic lies to later abandon figurate and poetic for true thinking. Aristotle reasserts most of the same notions but adds that God must be a personal, active, first moving cause, etc., his providence imminent. The Aristotelean conception requires polytheism only for political ends. The Stoic pantheism which held that creative fire, reason and law could all be worshipped, also granted that myths were indispensable allegoric representation of eternal elements. But the reaction of skepticism which, from its extreme distrust of reason, came to long for revelation and which, even among the Jews after the Babylonian exile, admitted the doctrine of angels and devils to gratify man's polytheistic cravings, led, among the Greeks, to the notion of demons, which were only the old deities of polytheism, as the servants and tools of the supreme being. The commingling of races, led to the conception of the later Stoics, that all men are children of the same father, to the belief in the unity of God, and to dissatisfaction with any merely national god or messiah. The last stand of polytheism was made in the new platonic philosophy in its long but ineffective struggle with christianity, which, refuting its central conception of a descending series of beings emanating from the one perfect light, which was at last extinguished in inert matter, adopted it as a form of speculation. Thus, Zeller argues, Greek philosophy prepared the way, though somewhat esoterically at first, or Christianity, and supplied the elements for its subsequent rational development to an extent hitherto unsuspected.

Pythagoras, after premising that the stronger the impression made by any person or event the greater will be the mythopœic reaction, he infers that the sage of Krotona must have been a many sided, earnest and sagacious ethical reformer. He came from his native Lanos to southern Italy in a time peculiarly fitted for his work. The central doctrine of the society of which he became the centre was that of future rewards and punishments and the transmigration of souls, or that moral purification was the highest end of life. This and his asceticism were perhaps learned in the orphic mysteries. He taught music—or the art of the muses—and gymnastics, and that all things might be expressed in numerical relations. His followers refused to eat the heart of animals because it was the seat of life, and were buried in linen garments that the suffering of wool-bearing animals might be mitigated. They held their goods in common, made fidelity the chief virtue, and taught that the best should rule. Such are probably the facts. Within four centuries after the master's death his followers described him as a prophet, whose head was constantly surrounded by a nimbus, who called up storms, healed the insane, arrested plagues, called down an eagle from the sky, ordered a bear to cease eating flesh and was obeyed, was seen at two distinct places at the same time, was called by name by a river god, remembered his preceding life in which he was the son of Hermes, as in this of Apollo, heard and taught the harmony of the spheres, had made a visit to Hades, etc. Nearly all distinguished men in Egypt and the east, it was said, had been his teachers. The older his school became the more his young disciples were able to tell of him. He left no writings, but in the first century B. C., many ascribed their writings to him partly as a compliment and partly to win consideration for them, till several scores of volumes now bear his name.

The germ of the Roman religion he finds in the Latin-Sabine veneration of invisible spiritual beings in nature. The solitude of woods, the gurgling of springs, the crackling of flames, the gloom of forests, the phenomena of the sky, of growth of the seasons, suggested to the old Romans three classes of natural forces, heavenly, terrestrial, and subterranean, which were poetically personified as gods instead of scientifically interpreted. The transition from a fanciful conception, to a



matured ethical religion can be nowhere so fully studied as among the Romans, whose fundamental characteristic was awe of unknown forces, and constraint before supernatural influences. Hence their reverence for tradition their extreme care not to offend the gods by inauspicious chance words, by the neglect of the innumerable formalities which hallowed nearly every act of life. For centuries at first, like the Germanic races, the Romans had no or few images of the gods but later there were throngs of protective deities *e. g.* one for gates, another for hinges, one for doors another for thresholds, or again one for the cry of a new born babe, another for the father's acknowledgement of it, a goddess of the cradle, another who presided over the ceremony of naming, another was protectress from witches. There was one each for the child's food and drink, one which brought it from the cradle to the bed. Sacrifice was made to appropriate deities respectively that the boy's bones might grow rightly, when he first stood, walked, went to and came from school, to others that he might reckon, sing, be strong in body and in mind, etc. In the third and fourth century B. C., the influence of the religions of the north and south, especially that of Greece, began to be felt. First the mythology and rites, then the literature and later the Greek philosophy radically changed the popular faith and at last prepared the way for an easy transition to christianity. First the shallow Euhemerus taught that the gods were ancestors and Jove was the head of an old regent house. His doctrines were long influential. The epicurean deist Lucretius described the world as set free from the heavy oppression of superstition by philosophy. The Gods were far off and cared not for men. They could have no sex or age, the story of Iphigenia was an unmitigated horror. Scaevola declared that the religion of the poets was childish and often immoral and that of the philosopher abstruse and powerless, and held that religion was chiefly an art of the statesman, who must and ought to use it for political ends. That the *pontifex maximus* could thus hold dogma as nothing beside religious cultus without exciting antagonism is significant. Varro, the authority for most modern knowledge of the religion of ancient Rome, declared God to be the universe, especially the soul and reason. The public religion should be allegorized philosophy rather than the myths of the poets. Seneca's conception of a world-ruling wisdom, beneficent goodness, pious disposition, his description of deity, near, about, in us, was the highest form of Stoicism, in which it most nearly coincided with Christianity. Epictetus and especially M. Aurelius, to whom Zeller devotes a laborious essay, were far less emancipated from the popular faith. The former believed in Demeter and Persephone because men enjoyed their fruits, and because they restrained from wrong, and apparently never reflected that there is no error which may not do good at times, while the latter, too practical for the Stoic allegorization of myths, believed not only in dreams and oracles, but apparently in many foreign rites himself, and excused many other superstitions because they satisfied man's religious needs. Cicero held that faith in deity was deeply implanted in all men and was taught by the beauty and wisdom of the world, and that a pure heart was the best worship, and that whether or not the being of the gods could be scientifically proved, the natural religion must be strenuously upheld as the chief bond of human society. After the republic the split between the doctrines of philosophy and the old Roman faith grew wider till the ancient gods lost their distinct individuality in the popular consciousness and the oriental monotheism of a denationalized Christianity readily absorbed all the purer and better elements of moral and religious culture into itself.

Nearly half of the first volume of the essays is devoted to a critical digest of the Tübingen school of theology of which Zeller is by far the

ablest and most philosophical and perhaps its most moderate living representative. The middle, half-orthodox party, which rested upon Hegel and Schleiermacher's attempt to reconcile reason and faith, and which never had any logical basis, was broken up by Strauss, Baur and Feuerbach and all its ambitious and domineering or weak and dependent members betook themselves to the confessional hyper-orthodoxy which was then favored by the reactionary German courts, and church and state fell largely under the leadership of dogmatic fanatics or impatient hierarchs. Though now a tidal wave of reaction has strongly set in, the desolation thus wrought in the head and heart may still be seen in the fact that, while other sciences have progressed, theology has been stationary or retrogressive during the last half century. On the one hand are the free religionists in Germany, shallow, tasteless, unscholarly, without thoroughness or method, negative and eminently unprogressive, and on the other ultra-orthodoxy of the Hengstenberg type ever elaborating its uncritical gospel harmonies or an exegesis of the patristic type which can put any meaning into or out of the scripture text, and well content with working out practical unionistic platforms for evangelical co-operation between trivially diverging sects. Both are alike unsusceptible, he says, to the great pressing needs of scientific theology, viz., the explanation of religion itself from its psychologic and of Christianity from its historical grounds. The latter problem is by no means finally solved by the Tübingen school. Baur, its coryphaeus, held that the last result of the criticism of the New Testament and other early Christian writers should and would be a noble and at the same time historical picture of Jesus himself. This, however, so far from being given by the negative residual methods of Strauss, could only be reached after the bias of each evangelist and apocryphists, the authenticity of every text, as well as its historical validity, and every personal, dogmatic or philosophical party influence of the age should have been weighed and tested. It was to this, in some sense preliminary work, which Strauss, by destroying the foundation of dogmatic supernaturalism, made possible, that Baur mainly devoted himself; and the goal which inspired him, but which he did not attain, must be striven for and reached by his method if Christian theology is to maintain a respectable position in the modern intellectual world. Man's desire for happiness is oppressed by a sense of his finitude, but the true religious consciousness reveals a higher and compensating happiness attained by the culture of purity of moral disposition. Man's elevation through the religious consciousness above the finitude of his nature, expressed as poverty of spirit, humility, simplicity, unselfishness, and the inwardness and absoluteness of religious life characterized by the doctrine of the fatherhood of God, something like this Baur thought would be ultimately found to be the fundamental idea of Jesus, conceived with intense realistic ethical genius and made a pressing and practical question by being boldly and sagaciously interpreted as the bottom meaning of a coming Messianic reconstruction of the Jewish state. In his earlier Hegelian period Baur regarded Christianity as mainly a philosophical, but later as a purely moral problem. The incomparable influence which Jesus started in history consisted not so much in any novelty of his conceptions,—these are now traced to earlier sources; but in the nobility of his character; the force and purity of his personality were so great that a new moral and religious type of life was inevitable. He *was* the Messiah in his own inspiring sense and not merely claimed to be. This, as every such conception must now be, in the absence of reliable or detailed historical information respecting Jesus, is as yet too general and vague, and must be, on the one hand elaborated by a sound and vigorous ethical philosophy into a wealth of needed moral power too long unutilized, (somewhat as Pfléiderer has since at-

tempted, although the ethical genius of a Fichte is more adequate to such a work than that of Baur,) and on the other it must be verified and corrected by a deeper and stricter critico-historical study than even that of the Tübingen school has made.

One of Zeller's best essays is devoted to a characterization of his teacher, F. C. Baur, who, in his uneventful home-staying life, his slowly ripening nature, his amazing industry and perseverance, in philosophic, critical tact and vigor, in the growing importance and initiative power of his work, is aptly compared with Kant. His temperate mind could hold an important question open for years, sifting and weighing evidence with piety to every suggestion of fact, and so honest and *anima candida*, so without hyper-self-consciousness that he seemed like the noblest of the old reformers, while his moral sensitiveness was so acute that he was more grieved by lack of thoroughness or truthfulness in the work of his pupils than by the bitterest attacks of his opponents. He lived in and for his work, but could always preach edifyingly to the *Gemeinde*, and his nature was profoundly religious and pastoral. His school, which has revolutionized religious opinions throughout Germany, Holland, Switzerland and even in protestant France, and has found many points of access even to English and American thought, is unlike the liberalism of deists, encyclopedists, etc., Schiller, Strauss and Feuerbach, in that it was founded by professional theologians and by men of deep personal piety. It simply drew conclusions which hovered in the intellectual air and which every one who thought logically must infer. It showed the time its own images and in urging that the New Testament was not pure history and not supernatural it only applied the critical methods which had almost revolutionized our knowledge of antiquity and its literature. Every one has smiled over the forcing, torturing and tasteless methods of the old German rationalism which explained away the miracle of Cana as a wedding jest, the fiery tongues of pentecost as electricity, the resurrection of Jesus as recovering from a trance, and declared that Paul at his conversion was blinded by lightning and was cured by the natural effect of the shock of an old man's hands, that the fetters were shaken from the hands of Paul and Silas in prison by an earthquake, that Jesus, though seeming to walk, on the water, really walked at its edge on the shore, etc.; in short, that oriental imagery and the reference of mediate natural processes immediately to God, which, though the exorcising supernatural, makes scripture none the less credible, but in an altered sense, even this had its effect upon the then current method of orthodox interpretation because it was no less tortuous and tasteless, as is perhaps best seen in the church history of Neander, who, without abandoning a single miracle or wavering on the doctrine of inspiration, which makes all Bible criticism impossible, yet loves to break off the points of the strongest miracles and is constantly conceding to the rationalistic methods, and capitulating to the *Zeit-Geist*, Bruno Baur, who has since declared the Tübingen school too conservative and apologetic, and been removed from his professorship, and who deduced Messiahship, resurrection and other evangelical *motives* from abstract dialectic principles ignoring or denying the existence of an historic Jesus. Marheineke, who made Bible texts into many-sided scholastic formulae, and Göschel, who all but identified philosophy and scripture, were alike unable to see the necessity or accept the results of such minute and painstaking researches as those of Baur.

First of all it must be borne in mind that the sense of literary property during the early Christian centuries was as undeveloped as any socialist could desire. Plato and Xenophanes put their sentences into the mouth of Socrates, [perhaps somewhat as a modern theologian states the *true Bible doctrine*, although in quite other than scriptural terms]. To present or develop the views of another, to win attention,

to produce immediate effect, to seek shelter from criticism behind a great name, personal modesty, piety to a beloved teacher to whom now a days a volume would be dedicated—all these motives of apochryphal fabrication were so common that a moralist must be as *naïve* and devoid of historic sense to raise the scruples of a modern conscience here, as to apply the laws against stealing in a modern statute book to the constitution of Sparta. The well proven cases of pseudonymous authorship in ancient times, many of which Zeller instances are, extremely numerous. Baur's conclusion that the gospels and the greater number of the epistles are unauthentic, of later origin and mainly records of violent partisan controversies which rent the earlier Christian party from its beginning, opens the most interesting and classic of all ancient literature to the use scholars, elevates of and frees the intellectual life of the age, to a degree to which only the work of modern science can be in any degree compared. It was his special endeavor to discover the bias or tendencies of the early Christian writers. In an age when men believed what pleased, interested, or edified them, whether that Homer argued for the Jewish sabbath, that Orpheus sang of Abraham, Moses and the ten commandments, or that an old or hardened heathen was converted by a relic stealthily laid under his pillow by night, in chiliasm, or that new records of the life of Jesus written by apostles were suddenly discovered at opportune polemic moments, and when credentials and criticism were all but unknown, the chief task of the historian is to seek and define the tides of party feeling and prejudices, the currents of men's wishes, ambitions and hopes, and occasionally political relations and the ground traits of individual character. These with traditions and sagas as material for a mythopoeic fantasy in a most agitated age of persecution and millennial expectations must be *controlled* before objective history can be reconstructed.

It was hard for the personal disciples of Jesus and the Ebionite party gathered about them to uphold his tenets against the dominant Pharasaic sect after their leader had been executed as a seditious agitator, but it was still harder for them to see Paul, who had never known Jesus personally, so successfully propagating his teachings, as not only independent of, but factually irreconcilable with Judaism, among Gentile races and even declaring that by it Jews were freed from their own laws. The conservative wing of the early Christian party, which held that Jesus could be the Messiah of the Jews only, and that the mosaic rites and laws were still binding as a propædæutic of Christianity, regarded Paul as an interloper who really designed to use the large collections he was making ostensibly for the church at Rome to buy the gift of apostleship. He is again even described as a conjurer who represented himself inspired till Peter exposed him. To define and defend his universalistic view, viz., that Christianity simply set men in right relations to God, Paul composed the letters to the Galatians, the Corinthians and especially that to the promising and hitherto neutral church at Rome. Meanwhile hard pressed and perplexed by the vast discrepancy between the actual low-born Jesus and the splendors of the Messianic kingdom of popular and patriotic hopes, the disciples had come to expect that he would appear again—an event by no means unparalleled in Jewish story and inaugurate a new kingdom of indescribable magnificence. Nero, the anti-Christ too, it was rumored was not dead but had escaped and would come again with oriental armies, and new wars and persecutions would most severely test the fidelity of the faithful. In this condition of things the book of revelations was written by John as a manifesto before its decisive struggle after which the millennial new Jerusalem, with Jesus as king, would fill the earth. Thus read it is no longer a puzzling riddle-book, but most historical and authentic, in fact the only book in the New Testament written by a

apostle-disciple. The old Israelite expectations are all to be fulfilled in the wonder world of the re-appearing Messiah. Those who claim to be apostles but are not, together with the hated doctrines of the Nicolaitans—bitter allusions to Paul and his teachings—are to have no place in the new theocracy, with its walls of jasper, its streets of gold and its tree of life. Thus too the most phantasmagorical dream of Jewish patriotism is successfully used to save the forlorn hope of a leaderless and losing cause. The controversy between the Pauline and the Jewish Christians was long and bitter, and colors, if it did inspire, most of the books of the new testament. The twelve apostles are paralleled, by the seventy co-workers of Paul. The Petrine party elaborated the Samaritan, Judean, the Pauline, the Galilean activity of Jesus. Peter is even represented as the founder of the first heathen church at Antioch, and is made to go to Rome because Paul had been there. James repudiates Paul's doctrine of justification by faith, urges that even devils may believe, and represents Jesus, perhaps his brother, as an ascetic Essene with long hair, and as abstaining from flesh and wine. In a word, Paulinism, which dispensed with offerings and with circumcision, and denied that the only way to the new faith was through Judaism, stands for the freedom of wisdom and mature manhood while the Jewish Christians argued for a status and moral regimen of adolescence.

Meanwhile both parties were persecuted alike, both were represented in nearly every church, practical, administrative, unity became more essential as the church began its immense organization, while old passions and prejudices only faintly survived in a new generation. In the second century a conciliatory desire to save the effects of the work of both wings is manifest by accommodating, and often even transforming their destructive tenets. Thus Acts written in the second century and based perhaps on notes of Paul's traveling companion, and Luke, though both written with unmistakable Pauline drift are very conciliatory, Colossians ends with complimentary mention of a list of Petrine worthies, while like Ephesians its Paulinism is very tempered. The first epistle of Peter makes surprising concessions to Paulinism. On the one hand it was apparently granted that Paul was too intricate and speculative, and that faith alone was not enough for salvation and on the other it was necessarily acknowledged that the wall of partition, between Jews and Gentiles was broken down in fact, and the vast number of non-Jewish Christians were taken into fellowship. Thenceforth all traces of primitive discord were carefully scored away, and the energies of the church were free for the work of practical and dogmatic development and defense. As the church grew, all parties united to elevate the conception of the person of Christ still higher, a convenient point for dogmatic unity in zeal for which old discords might be forgotten, until at last even the Messiah idea with which it had become identified in the first century was not exalted enough for the head of a church that had its stronghold in the capital city of the world, and was destined to become universal, and of a hierarchy so rapidly growing in influence and self-conscious dignity. The son of David gradually became with the growing influence of the ultra-Pauline Gentile element and the Alexandrian gnostic-philosophy not merely the heavenly pneumatic man, the new Adam, but the pre-existent, creative Word. The gospel of John, (A. D. 170-180) which is not historical, but represents the maturest and best points of the work and teaching of Christianity up to the period of its composition, which quietly appropriates the serviceable elements of the dangerous heresies of gnosticism and montanism, and shows no trace of heirarchism in the church, marks the point where the history of primitive Christianity ends and that of catholicism begins. The charm of the Johannean image of Jesus, so pure, so exalted and almost femininely delicate, so harmonious that his inward peace was

undisturbed by conflict and sorrow, and so free from all earthly limitations is unprecedented among all ideal personalities hitherto offered to human contemplation. The Johannean gospel not only reconstructed the previous Christian history from its new and tranquil stand-point, but represents the highest theological development of the first period of Christian history.

In an essay entitled *Greek and Roman Prejudices against Christianity*, Zeller shows that while the reign of Alexander and the Roman Empire had prepared the way for the outward spread of Christianity, the popular Stoic philosophy, which taught that all men were brothers with equal rights and duties, and subject to the same moral law, which instead of faith made ethical temper the saving principle and divided mankind into two great classes, the fools and the wise, instead of the redeemed and the lost, and which longed for the "birth-day of eternity," an entrance into the "great eternal peace," prepared the mental soil for the reception of Christian doctrine. The popular heathen notion was that the Christians, if not all Syrian barbarians, were yet atheists, criminals, who perhaps cooked and ate children, prayed to a God with an ass' head, were the worst and most unpatriotic citizens, and in fact enemies of the human race, so that Nero found no difficulty in circulating the report that it was they who had fired Rome. Pliny thought their creed in itself a harmless superstition, but believed their stiff-neckedness in refusing to adore images of the Gods and the Emperor, and in violating the laws against making proselytes should be punished. The mild M. Aurelius persecuted them because he deemed the pertinacity of their creed,—so unlike his all sided toleration and uncritical eclecticism, dangerous to the discipline of the state. Lucian said the sect was composed of pitiable and deluded disciples of an arch sophist. The platonic Celsus argued that Jesus had stolen and disturbed philosophic doctrines which he could not understand, was of dishonorable birth, and a conjurer. Greek joyousness and Roman pride had only contempt for a religion designed for the sorrowing, oppressed, weak and guilty. The Neoplatonists revered Jesus, but one inquired like Reimarus, why, if salvation was through him, he appeared so late, and urged that if Peter and Paul could disagree about fundamental tenets his doctrine must be very uncertain, another thought Jesus did too few miracles to be really a god and proved that Apollonius did far more, while Julian, believing it was impossible for all men to have the same religion, argued that all noble men and great deeds in the world had come from heathendom and forbade Christians to teach the ancient literature.

In the saga of Peter as Roman Bishop the ultra ebionite view of Paul, which described him under the name of Simon the gnostic Samaritan sorcerer, who, after he had been exposed by Peter in Palestine came to Rome, where, by his arts and by the aid of demons, he had won great honors and many followers, is the ground motive. Later when Romish canonists sought to derive the power of the popes directly through Peter it is said that the latter followed Simon to Rome. The Jewish legend dishonored Paul whom the catholic party would honor, hence he is now distinguished from his double and made to join Peter in opposing Simon, and both Paul and Peter it was said died in Rome. Later Peter alone is made the first Bishop of Rome and thus the greatest work of Paul's life is accredited to the hostile apostle of the circumcision.

Much importance is ascribed to Schweigler's work on Montanism and the Post-apostolic age wherein it is concluded that Christianity assumed at first to be nothing but a more complete form of essenic Judaism, and that the autonomy and universality which Paul attempted to give it, transformed and dejudaized it materially less than had been generally supposed.

In the Platonic republic Zeller sees not only a significant ideal and prophecy impossible of realization, despite Plato's unreserved belief in it, and not only a product of the time, when, after the Peloponnesian war, the dangers of individualism, the greed of riches and party strife seemed to show that men could not be trusted with their own development, but especially a type of society which has been no less than a germ for the organization of the mediaeval church. Instead of the philosophers who were to rule absolutely in the Platonic republic, are the priests, instead of the warrior cast, the temporal powers, instead of community of goods which was an early Christian ideal voluntary poverty of goods or of spirit and the mendicant orders. Community of wives, which was recommended to restrain not to satisfy desire, is paralleled by celibacy that monks may live all for the church. Both the ideal and the actualized system rest upon ethical dualism and teach that suffering here will be compensated in a future life and both assert a divine leadership of the state. The republic, like the kingdom of God, is an institution for training men in virtue. The church on the other hand does not so absolutely subordinate the individual to the community and the spirit of universal fraternity is widely contrasted with the casts and the national exclusiveness of the republic. While Plato would class modern theology, so far as it does not coincide with philosophy as mythology, and would be able to find in modern universities no suitable philosophers for rulers, and would be incensed at the modern political romances, wherein private interest is satisfied instead of annihilated, he must nevertheless be counted as one of the most important predecessors of organized Christianity. Much space is devoted to show that this was not the result of mere analogy but was history and that Plato's conception, at first too spiritualistic to be popular, had passed into the general culture of the day.

This matured and moderated digest of the Tübingen school so briefly and imperfectly epitomized and digested above, records, we believe, the most important achievement of the historic critical method. It affords the general terms of a suggestive and edifying solution of the most intricate and also the most obscured of all historical problems,—a problem not of one sect and race or century, but of commingled nationalities of contending political and philosophical, religious, partisan and personal interests. The facts were so inaccessible and so metamorphosed in this long contest, that only the most patient and conscientious research coupled with amazing psychologic insight and tact was able to reconstruct them at last after ages of misconception, with so high a degree of verisimilitude that the most distinguished of Roman historians, whose essential impartiality cannot be denied, declared that several years ago no German scholar under forty-five had thoroughly studied the Tübingen writers without being in the main convinced by them. There will long be many to fear that moral restraints may be practically weakened if scripture is proven uninspired in the old sense, or if miracles are disallowed, just as the Emperor Julian feared that classical literature would be ignored and perhaps lost if faith in the ancient gods was destroyed. This is, without doubt, sometimes the case among the young and the indiscriminating. But on the other hand it is only thus now made possible for men of thorough modern culture and moral self-respect to call themselves Christians if they will, and to be so in mind and heart in a sense deeper and larger than many conventional churchmen comprehend, and even if they see fit and hopeful occasion, to urge friendly even though misconstrued aid in ameliorating the narrow severity in faith and life, and in sustaining and reforming church organization, as a right by no means invalidated by stricter modern definitions of the Christian name but rather new vested by the supreme sanction of a positive and adult moral understanding. Myth is a deeper

and broader expression of humanity's common nature and needs than reason itself has yet attained. It is never the utterance of the mere individual, but is the *logos*, or over-soul of the half-unconscious moral instinct of a race or an age. It is never bound too closely to details of place or time. These only hinder or embarrass its rare and strange moving and edifying power. In its noblest scriptural form,—Biblical in the classic sense wherever found—it comes most clearly and directly home to the *Gemüth*, takes men out of their own selfish personal lives, and raises, purifies and broadens their motives and feelings and purposes, as nothing else does. How to make it most effective for good is a problem which *homiletic* art has perhaps not yet finally solved.

The "Tübingen men" in Germany have grown now inactive and retrospective, and even Zeller is somewhat prolix and boastful in his recapitulations, and yet not only is their critical work incomplete, but its practical deductions, (the last consideration of a German savant) because left to be drawn in a negative, popular and superficial way, have been often sadly injurious instead of most helpful as they should be to the cause of religion and morality, and the German capital has grown perhaps more unconscious of the existence of religion and its institutions than any city in Christendom. Far from assenting to any ultra theories as *e. g.* that of Rothe—that the modern state more than the church expresses the essence of Christianity,—we cannot deny that the latter has grown far too consubstantial with our social, moral, intellectual and æsthetic life and development to be eradicated by any violence, or even to be intellectually distinguished and traced through all the long and subtle associations, by which it has become ingrained in our inmost psychic character. By being proven the oldest of all historic categories, and rooted in the earliest written records, instead of a supernatural graft upon an old and decaying trunk, it challenges the reverence of science itself as the most important problem of popular (*Völker*) psychology, by contributing to the experimental solution of which all known civilized races and ages have become in a noble philosophic sense organically united. As the modern musical scale, and the masterpieces composed in it are not endangered by the proof of its mathematical inaccuracy, its rude empirical origin, or by the suggestions of improvement, as the modern state is not lost to socialism by the demonstration that all values originated in the ten fingers of the working man, or that the rights of bequest and of absolute private ownership are, so to speak, recent habits, resting upon a series of accidents and misconceptions, so the Christian church is by no means essentially or permanently weakened by being compelled to relinquish its belief in miracles, inspiration and an incarnate deity for more historical conceptions of its origin. It is only another reformation that impends, as radical, possibly, to the more assumptive and unreasoning of modern Pharisees as was the new dispensation of Jesus itself, but only salutary to every true religious interest.

A brief notice of some of Zeller's less important essays will perhaps convey a better idea of the range and minuteness of his learning and of the acuteness of his critical power. In his defence of Xanthippe he reminds us that the young wife of an old man who could humorously boast of the advantage of ugliness like his over the classic Greek type of beauty, that the bridge of his nose was low, that with one of his prominent eyes he could look directly into the other, his mouth so large that he could save much time by eating faster than others, and his lips so thick and soft that he could give and receive the sweetest kisses, and whose ponderous body was the type of Silenus, might be excused for not being proud of the most monstrous among all the handsome Greeks for a husband. Moreover he would seek no office, lounged all day on the streets and in the public marts talking with tailor, shoemaker and



even *heterai* about the dialectic conception of their profession, and although so poor that wife and husband had but one outer garment between them so that one must stay at home when the other was out, would sometimes stand all day in one spot lost in revery, ridiculed by boys and comedians, and at last come home, old and fat as he was, to practice a dancing lesson for which, perhaps, he had paid his last *heller*. Moreover the suspicion that he had married her as a discipline in patience would hardly have been delicate and flattering to a woman's nature. When she came sobbing with a child in her arms to see him for the last time in prison before the fatal draught of hemlock, and severely looking at her he ordered Kriton to take her home, and when she had been removed screaming, he calmly began a philosophic discourse. Possibly Xanthippe threw dirty water upon him, attempted to tear off his garments in the market place, overthrew his table and trod upon a cake that had just been sent in, no one knows from whom, and perhaps Socrates consoled himself that she never kicked or bit him, but more probably these are unsalted inventions of lively Greek gossips or chronicles to make the name of Socrates brighter by contrast. She was probably no worse than many a modern woman would have been with her provocation.

Very readable is his characterization of Alexander the Paphlagonian imposter and Peregrinus the enthusiast. The former was famous for his beauty, and lived in the time of Trajan. Planning to found a new oracle at Abonuteichas, he buried and caused to be found, brazen tablets announcing that Askulepios and his father Apollo were about to remove thither, caused it to be announced that he was the grandson of the former, and later appeared himself in purple with the sword of Perseus in a feigned ecstasy and with artificial foam flowing from his mouth. Throwing aside all his garments he showed the assembled multitude a young serpent in a broken egg shell, and a few days later an immense artificial snake with a human face, with eyes and mouth worked by invisible hairs, which he declared had grown from the little one and was a new God, Elycon, and from whom he would receive divine messages. Sealed letters were sent, and if they could be opened and sealed without suspicion were returned with answers written beneath every question. He hired a *claque* in distant cities and finally in Rome who reported the most astonishing miracles—hidden treasures and thieves discovered, the sick healed and even the dead raised. Messengers were bribed, difficult questions generously referred to the priests of other oracles, until at last Rutillius, a man of high standing in the Roman court, like another Zöllner, fell completely into his net, and he became the fashion in the imperial city to which he graciously offered his protection against pest, conflagration and earthquake. He became immensely rich and made it dangerous for rationalistic epicureans or for Christians to attempt to expose him, and died at the age of seventy with undiminished fame.

Peregrinus of Pazium gave his fortune to his townsmen and traveled in the east where he learned the "rare wisdom" of the Christians who, it was said made him a bishop. Later he appeared in Rome as a cynic, anathematizing all the world, and especially the Roman emperor Antonius Pius, who banished him from the city limits, beyond which he lived in a hut and attracted many young men by his philosophical discourses. He afterwards went to Greece, and when no one took further notice of him, announced at the end of the Olympic games that at the end of the next festival he would burn himself alive. When the time came he had an immense pile erected, made a long harangue to the curious crowd, enumerating all the privations and sufferings which he had borne in the service of philosophy, declared he would die, like Heracles, to teach men to dispise death. As, contrary to his hopes, no one interfered, but rather when a single voice cried "save thyself to the Greeks,"

the crowd vociferously exhorted him to courage and the speedy accomplishment of his purpose, after adjourning the act till another night "that the moon might also see it," clad in the Cynic uniform, casting a handful of incense into the flames and commending himself to the spirits of his ancestors, he walked tremblingly and pale into the flames and was seen no more.

In "A Strike in Rome" Zeller discusses the variously recorded story of the origin of the Roman festival *quingaturus*. The pipers, it is said, vexed by certain restrictions of their prerogatives, withdrew to a man to Tibur and occasioned thereby great distress in Rome. There could be no festive sacrifices to the gods, no religious processions, no marriages, no burials. The senate in vain tried to induce the irate musicians to return, and only after they had been made drunk at a feast given in Tibur and brought home in wagons did they consent, if all their ancient rites were restored, to resume their duties as before. This is compared with the legend of the origin of festivals of *carmenta*. The Roman matrons of old had the right to ride in carriages, of which they were deprived by the senate. They all swore to bear no more children till the privilege was restored, which the senate hastened to do. Both these tales, the former of which has been hitherto undoubted, Zeller argues with great ingenuity are instances of the aitiological sagas so common among the Romans and utterly without historical foundation.

In characterizing Fichte as a politician we are told that he possessed the very rare combination of great scientific acumen and culture, with immense vigor and sensitiveness of moral character. It was the substance of his philosophy that the will of the individual created not only his own character, but his own world, and that individual action and development might be free and unhindered, was the ground motive of his life. The true state itself is only a three-fold compact of the sovereign people who can therefore never rebel. Its business is solely to protect men in their rights. To this end they must oversee all departments of work in every detail, and cause every one to be remunerated according to his services. This view has made him a favorite with the modern socialists. It alone controls intercourse with foreign states and its citizens should have only its money and never that of other countries. So long as the state is anything other than the spontaneous organization of the people, the latter are not free. An absolutely free people would need no state. The fate of the true culture of freedom rests with regenerated Germany. Her language which has been developed indigenously, without obscured etymologies, from a primitive kindred people and not adopted or borrowed, or adumbrated by change, like that of other European nations, makes true mental freedom possibly only for her people. His philosophy and his political theories, it is concluded, are both superseded by later and better views, but will yet long remain, even where most contradicted, very instructive and elevating.

In Wolf's expulsion from Halle, Zeller sees the pure epitome of a contest which is not yet ended. At the close of the thirty years' war Germany had grown barbarous, ignorant, schismatic, sensuous in taste and life to a degree which German patriotism now finds it hard to admit. Protestantism had fallen into the hands of men whose rule was scarcely less fruitless, formal and unprogressive than that of the Jesuits then dominant in the catholic church. It had no understanding of the religious needs of the people and had driven edification from the church, learning from the schools, and freedom and thoroughness from the universities and from literature. At this period pietism and philosophy first took their rise in Germany. Spencer, reacting against the dry and dead intellectualism of theology, urged at first a most salutary form of emotional and practical religious living, and argued the necessity of a definite and typical change of inner life which found wide acceptance

and has founded the Lutheran church deep in the *Gemüth* and given it its peculiar freedom and independence of scientific reason. Wolff, whose methods affected mathematical form and certainty, who used the vernacular tongue in his thronged philosophical lecture room, who had argued that even an atheist might lead a moral life, and that if no divine revelation had been made even reason would incline men to virtuous lives, was violently attacked by the pietists and obliged to enter into tedious and profitless disputations. He saw his students and followers and even his friends gradually alienated from him until at length the king of Prussia, induced by a plump lie of an enemy of Wolff, ordered him to leave his domains within forty-eight hours on penalty of being hung, and made it a crime to circulate or read his writings. This his pietistic colleagues declared was in answer to their prayers. He was recalled late but not until his vigor and his influence were forever impaired.

The relations of church and state in the past and present and the discipline, cultus, orders, property and influence on education of the former are discussed from an abstract, moral stand-point in a readable little volume, which space fails us to epitomize. (1). In another essay

(1). Staat u Kirche : Vorlesungen an der Universität zu Berlin, gehalten von Edward Zeller, 1873, p. 250.

the trial of Galileo studied in part from original sources, is described, Schwegler, Waitz and Lessing as theologians are characterized, the relations of policy and justice, and of nationality and humanity are discussed, and the present condition and problems of German philosophy, and of the *theory of knowledge* (Erkenntniss-theorie) are explained.

The latter has been the central question in German philosophy since Kant brought into flux the question of the origin and truth of our notions of things. Based upon special solutions of it, the great idealistic systems were wrought out. The cry "back to Kant," and the general abandonment of the foundations upon which Fichte, Schelling and Hegel built, which in many quarters has degenerated to an uncritical cultus of Kantian orthodoxy was at first matured by the conviction that, he alone had fairly examined and justly estimated the importance of the "theory of knowledge," while later the experimental psychology of the physiologists and the studies of Helmholtz have only more specially elaborated this theory and more critically answered Kant's problem. We must not infer from the study of Kant that experience can give *unordered* matter, or that all form is innate, still less can we agree with him that because we apprehend things by means of subjective forms we must necessarily be ignorant of things as they are in themselves. There is another case. Perhaps the forms are adapted by nature to give us the *right* view of things. Subjective and objective belong to one nature. True if we isolate one phenomenon we cannot distinguish its elements, but every new observation applies the method of difference. We prefer to say that with the increasing compass and accuracy of our knowledge, it approaches practically—though not theoretically in the sense of Fichte and Hegel—to absoluteness. It necessarily grows certain as it grows wide. It is reflection which sifts out the *a priori* elements from experience and thus brings knowledge of things. Hence logic is grounded on the theory of knowledge, which must in turn be completed by it. Number, time and space Zeller makes the most general forms of connecting objects. Properties are causal ideas which are not innate in the old historic sense—so intimately connected with the doctrine of pre-existence—but they are hypotheses to explain the unifying impulse of the mind. Space, however, unlike the other two which are objectively real, at the basis of being and change, may be only the general way in which things impress us, or a general form of reaction of our organism in its habit of connecting sensations. Different hypotheses of the external

cause of sensation may supersede it; or again tri-dimensional space may be only a special case of another relation, embracing other cases also.

Here at last we glimpse a limit to Zeller's remarkably wide critical horizon which is particularly manifest throughout his courses of psychological lectures. The hypothesis of a fourth dimension of space, in no way destroys the validity of the old geometrical three. Mathematical physics has elaborated equations containing functions which might be true in a space of  $x$  dimensions and forthwith metaphysical psychologists, reasserting old idealistic traditions, or perhaps too easily bullied by scientific authorities, stultify science by talking of an absolutely spaceless universe, and a non-extended matter. To Zeller this is only a logical possibility which must not be forgotten. Like many of the older German professors of philosophy he does not deem it all too unworthy the dignity of his department to interest a curious class by recounting some of the more striking results and methods of the physiological study of sensation, but too often only to disparage their philosophical importance and to limit to the narrowest the impressions deduced from them in detail while roundly acknowledging the general importance of such investigations for the theory of knowledge. The fundamental importance and the immense scope of these, centering as they do about the transforming psychological conception of reflex action modified by specific nervous functions and inhibition, Zeller fails adequately to appreciate. We will pause here only to observe that the whole drift of German physiology is now strongly and almost without exception against the possibility of such materialistic deductions as Zeller fears therefrom.

Philosophical truths to Zeller are not coins stamped and weighed to pass unchanged from hand to hand, but historical products deeply rooted in personal, national and religious character. As such they must first be approached and studied if we would add our own individual thinking as a contribution however trivial to the thoughts of the race, instead of reviving old issues, resolving old problems and thrice slaying the slain. The history of philosophy is thus a labor-saving department of study most economic of mental effort, and prepares men for the problems of to-day. It should aim in the first place simply to present and not to criticise or estimate its subject matter. It should teach us how our consciousness became what it is. It should show that all practical sciences or institutions of human life and society presuppose a theoretical foundation which is deep and broad, in proportion as they are high or important. Not only do the roots of all things go back to philosophy but it is an unnatural condition of things if philosophy is suspected or degraded. As Cavour said the state should be occasionally led back to first principles, even by revolution if need be, so it is we not to allow men entirely to forget how law and every political and social institution were at first and still are at bottom, only devices to establish simple morality as an individual habit, and between man and man, and that all religions are but formulations of man's relations to the universe as a whole. Moreover the special branches of knowledge are able to act and react fruitfully upon each other only as it is seen how organically they are connected. The effect of science upon philosophy may be in some sense compared to its effect upon poetry. Since it became impossible to believe longer in myths, poetry, instead of being crippled or suffering any limitation of her domain as many predicted, has found new sources of inspiration deeper and stronger than ever before while even historic myths exert undiminished magic charm over the imagination of men. So likewise the metaphysical myths, Platonic ideas and ideals, innate intuitions, an absolute ego, a dialectic, world-developing reason, a universal will, and scores more, are no less quick-

ening now than before while the observational and more exact experimental study of the psychic powers are opening up a radically new conception of the human soul, reason and conscience. With this is suggested, at least to those where supreme passion of life it is to conceive it however faintly, the possibility again of one organized intellectual world manifestly monistic, without unscientific, hyper-logical guesswork, in which idealism and realism, instead of being absolute even in their opposition are simply two cardinal points of direction of which philosophic thought must not lose sight.

In his somewhat popular history of German philosophy since Leibnitz<sup>1</sup> written as the thirteenth volume of the History of Science in Germany under the auspices of the Saxon commission, somewhat monographic, and mainly devoted to the seven great names from Leibnitz to Schopenhauer both inclusive and not to be compared with Kuno Fischer's exhaustive work in the history of modern philosophy, Zeller urges that the reformation made Germany introspective. The deepest roots of her power in the world's history he finds in her philosophy and more especially in her idealism at once its weakness and its strength. Germany will be false to all her traditions if she forgets the power of subjective reflection. Her philosophy was developed in a period of peace

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie seit Leibnitz* von E. Zeller, 1873, pp. 917.

unbroken save by the inspiring war of liberation, and even now with all her political military and material successes, her growing love of money, and devotion to business must be guarded with pious patriotic care as yet full of saving and guiding power.

Zeller's great life-work is of course his history of Greek philosophy, the first part of the first edition of which was printed more than a quarter of a century ago and which has now reached a fourth edition. It is by far the best work on the subject. His characterization of the pre-Socratic philosophy, though as unlike the speculative histories of Hegel or Schwegler as possible, is a masterpiece of constructive criticism. The laborious minuteness with which every trace of suggestion is followed up, the compass of his method which requires familiarity with every phase of contemporary Greek life and history, the conscientious care to avoid all false idealizations and to hold every personal preference or prejudice in perfect poise and his constant verification by quotations have all combined to make his readers conceive of Greek thought as perhaps less pure and perfect and less transcendently wonderful than we were wont, but have invested the theme with a nearer and far more sympathetic human interest than ever before. It is of course impossible in our limits to enter into any detailed review of this work, but this rough sketch of its author's varied intellectual labors will not have been written in vain if it shall induce the reader to take this work seriously in hand for himself.

Ed.